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 When the former British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was 
once queried as to why he had changed his policies, he justified 
himself by saying Events, dear boy, events. For good or for ill, 
politicians shape public policy by taking account of both principles 
and events: and when the balance tilts too much towards the latter, 
are roundly criticised for choosing the expedient over the principled. 
Economists would like to see themselves aligned with principle, 
distilling order from the mass of current events so as to provide 
better guidance to policymakers in future. But as a social science, 
economics cannot devise exact laws or principles, as can the physical 




In recent times, economists with a strong competition 
perspective1 have prescribed major changes for the Irish public bus 
market. Barrett (2004) considered that Irish public bus companies 
operated monopolistically, had captured their regulators and 
recommended that UK-style bus deregulation be introduced to 
increase competition. A closer look at the events  side of the bus 
equation shows little evidence of monopolistic operation and 
regulatory capture in the Irish bus market, dismisses bus franchising 
and bus deregulation as having failed abroad and advises that 
network management holds out some hope for modernising the 
Irish public bus system. 
BUS PRICING 
In Ireland, subsidies for public bus operations have historically been 
low, and this has not changed with recent Celtic Tiger prosperity. In 
2002, Ireland subsidised 17 per cent of the operating costs of public 
buses.
2 This was the lowest subsidy rate in the EU. Again in 2002, 
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1 Competition Authority (2000), Barrett (2004). 
2 Confederation of Passenger Transport (CPT) (2003). public bus operation in Dublin received a subsidy for 25 per cent of 
its total costs. This was the third-lowest level of city bus subsidy in 
the EU, after Glasgow and Oslo. This suggests that, in European 
funding terms, Irish public bus companies were unable to capture 
their regulators, either at supervisory level (Department of 
Transport) or at Exchequer level (Department of Finance). 
Figure 1: Funding of Bus Public Transport 
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Ireland’s low subsidy rate for public buses does not seem to be 
due to high prices/fares. Exact comparisons of urban bus fares 
across Europe are difficult because of differences in population 
density/bus loading, subsidy levels and in congestion caused by 
inadequate infrastructural investment. Taking a monthly commuter 
ticket as a fare least distorted by promotional discounts, Irish city 
bus fares in 2001 were about average for the EU.3 Sharp increases 
since then have moved Irish urban bus fares above the European 
average, but they remain substantially below those of UK cities. 
Overall, there is little evidence that the public bus provider in 
Dublin has been allowed to extract monopoly rents through high 
bus fares. 
Outside Dublin, Barrett (2004) concluded that bus fares are 




3 EC DG Energy and Transport (2002). Steer et al. (2002) considered that inter-
regional fares in Ireland “…appear to represent good value, in comparison with 
other European countries.”   3 
The reality is more modulated: bus fares are determined (in 
descending order of importance) by costs (both internal and 
external), by patronage, and by competition from other bus 
operators.  
Table 1: Bus Éireann Fares Per Mile (February 2005) 
Route  Distance 
miles 
Single 
€ per mile 
Day return 
€ per mile 
Length       
Dublin/Westport  167  0.099  0.055 
Dublin/Ballina  152  0.105  0.081 
       
Patronage       
Dublin/Castleisland*  172  0.058  0.058 
       
Competition       
Dublin/Galway  135  0.100  0.063 
Dublin/Waterford  80  0.125  0.118 
* February special offer: any route in Ireland for €10 adult single, €20 return.    
 
Because fixed costs bulk large in bus transport, unit fares fall 
rapidly with distance/time; thus the longest journeys (e.g. 
Dublin/Westport, Dublin/Ballina) have among the lowest fares per 
mile, in spite of the absence of bus competition. Bus loading or 
patronage is the second most important contributor to profitable 
bus operation. The need for increased patronage helps to restrain 
bus fares on all routes to levels which are competitive with car 
travel,4 encourages frequent special offers (as in Table 1) and  means 
that return fares (for all companies) offer substantial discounts on 
twice the single fare. Having adjusted for bus route lengths and 
loadings, it is accepted that competitive tension has a beneficial 
impact on fares and on service levels. But the direct and indirect 
evidence is weak that Bus Éireann pursues monopolistic pricing 
policies on its routes. The direct evidence shows Bus Éireann on the 
contested Galway/Dublin route to be a persistent price-taker rather 
than a price-maker: initially, Nestor was the lower priced operator 
and currently Citylink is 3 – 12 per cent lower than Bus Éireann on 
three typical fares.5 In addition, in the 2001 High Court action taken 
by Nestor against Bus Éireann, Nestor’s claim that Bus Éireann was 
anti-competitive and monopolistic was dismissed by consent,6 and 
costs were awarded against Nestor. Indirectly one would expect that 
if Bus Éireann had been exacting monopoly rents from uncontested 
routes, that new competitors would quickly enter these routes. The 
 
4 Inter-city rail fares are not price-competitive with inter-city bus, although rail does 
offer distinct advantages in shorter journey times and in greater certainty of arrival 
on time. Despite much larger subsidies for rail than for bus, inter-city rail fares 
typically average over twice those of comparable bus fares. This suggests that 
subsidies for restored rail operations on routes with low population densities (e.g. 
Dublin/Navan, Sligo/Galway) would need to be much larger than those currently 
provided, if rail travel was to be fare-competitive with car or bus travel on these 
routes. 
5 I.e. adult single, adult daily return and adult monthly return. 
6 O’Neill, J. (2001). opposite has occurred, with competitors exiting from a number of 
routes.7
Finally, in relation to the rate of increase in Irish bus fares, CSO 
indices show bus fares from 1990-2004 rising at an average of 3.0 
per cent per annum, broadly in line with car operating costs at 2.8 
per cent per annum and with the rise in consumer prices generally at 
2.9 per cent per annum. For most of the period (from 1990-2002) 
increases in bus fares lagged behind increases in consumer prices, 
but rose by 14.5  per cent in the last two years, see Figure 2.8
Figure 2: Bus Fares, Car Operating Costs and Consumer Prices9





















If Irish public bus companies had operated monopolistically and 
had captured their regulators from 1990-2004, they should have 
been able to raise prices faster than inflation. The output evidence in 
relation to bus fares strongly suggests that transport regulators were 
paying more heed over this period to consumer than to producer 
interests. 
BUS PATRONAGE 
Within the EU-15, Ireland in 2001 was among the most intensive per 
capita consumers of bus and coach transport, while per capita growth 
in Irish bus patronage of 50 per cent from 1991-2001 was the 
highest in the EU. 
Topography rather than income seems to influence intensive bus 
usage, since poor, mountainous Greece just shades rich, 
mountainous Luxembourg for the first position. Ireland is in a 
second high bus-usage grouping which also contains Denmark, Italy 
 
7 E.g. FS Travel ex Waterford, Carew ex Sligo, Barton ex Ballina, Capital ex 
Dundalk.  
8 This reflected the recent Exchequer preference for point charges over central 
subsidies. 
9 Central Statistics Office (2005). 
  4and Austria.10 The UK takes second-last position to France in terms 
of bus usage per capita, see Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Passenger Transport by Buses and Coach 
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 of potential bus patronage  An ex ante view in 1991 could not 
hav
THE POLICY AGENDA? 
nce 
 
e expected that Ireland would lead the EU in growth over the 
following decade. It had the lowest density of population in Europe 
outside of the Scandinavian countries and its publicly-owned bus 
companies would probably stifle innovation. In fact, product 
innovation in Dublin has resulted in Quality Bus Corridors and 
outside Dublin the ailing stage carriage system has been successfully 
product-cannibalised by Expressway.11 Both are recognised and 
emulated in the EU as leading-edge products for increasing bus 
patronage.  
BUSES INFLUENCING 
In relation to subsidies and fares there appears to be little evide
of regulatory capture by public bus companies. In relation to the 
major external cost imposed on bus operators by the regulatory 
authorities – bus speeds/congestion – there is also little evidence 
that the needs of public bus companies are driving the policy 
agenda. Peak hour bus speeds in Dublin (13.5 kph) and Cork (11.9 
kph) are among the lowest in Europe, see Figure 4.  
By being forced to operate at slower speeds than their peers 
abroad, congestion increased Dublin Bus’ costs by €49.4 million in 
2003 or by 23 per cent of total and increased Bus Éireann’s costs by 
€19.2 million or by 8 per cent of total.12 Congestion costs for both 
companies amounted to almost 90 per cent of their Public Service 
Obligation (PSO) subsidies; this is not an acceptable policy outcome. 
Figure 4: Peak Hour Bus Speeds  (kph) 
10 Eurostat (2004). Current estimates show Ireland’s per capita bus usage to be the 
second-highest in Europe. 
11 A decade before Ryanair applied the same pricing principle to budget airline 
operations in Europe, Expressway set prices to maximise yields per full bus rather 
than yields per passenger.  


















































































In spite of b
panies’ needs are frequently given a lower priority than those of 
pedestrians,13 local traders14 or fixed-line transport. The policy 
changes required to improve bus speeds in Irish cities would not be 
seen as exceptional in other EU countries, but they have not been 
agreed to, much less implemented in Ireland viz. 
•  In the medium term, some new administrative/policy 
arrangement is required to intensify land use and public 
transport use in Dublin,15 while for the country as a whole 
there needs to be a political acceptance of the intensification 
objective of the National Spatial Strategy. In addition, in all 
cities, there is a need for grade separation of traffic at major 
intersections and for more flow-friendly arrangements at 
other junctions. 
In the short term Irish cities need to discriminate more in 
favour of buses, perhaps by improving their rollout of 
reserved bus lanes, by introducing park-and-ride facilities 
and perhaps by giving buses priority at traffic lights (Casey, 
2003). 
13 In recent years, pressure from community groups has resulted in a sharp increase 
in the number of pedestrian traffic lights installed in Dublin. Would a cost-benefit 
analysis of the current density of traffic lights demonstrate that their benefits to 
citizens as pedestrians outweighed the extra costs imposed on citizens as bus and 
car users? 
14 Buses were reserved for a Quality Bus Corridor (QBC) in Limerick from the city 
centre to the University in 2001, but objections from local traders stopped its 
introduction. Bus travel times on this route had almost doubled from 1991. 
15 Similar to New Institutional Arrangements for Land Use and Transport in the Greater 
Dublin Area, Department of the Environment and Local Government/of Public 
Enterprise (2001). BUS POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS  2. 
Lessons from 
Abroad
During recent decades, competition economists16 were almost 
unanimous in their prescription as to how the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of public bus operations could be improved. They 
assumed that public bus transport passed the privatisation test 
proposed in 1993 by Stiglitz, i.e., that commercial/profit-related 
objectives were predominant and that they could be separated from 
the public interest objectives in a meaningful way. By exposing 
public bus operations to competition, under a light regulatory 
regime, consumer surplus and bus output would both be maximised, 
while Exchequer support would be minimised. Table 2 summarises 
the World Bank’s17 spectrum of choices – from public monopoly to 
deregulation – available to policymakers seeking to introduce 
competition and private participation into public bus services. 
Table  2:  Forms of Competition and Private Participation in Bus 
Transport 












Competition for the market: Franchising 
 
 
Competition in the market: De-regulation 
 
In Ireland the 1932 Road Transport Act effectively established 
CIE as a public monopoly for the provision of bus services, with a 
view to protecting the railways from competition, Barrett (2000), p. 
2. During subsequent decades there was a gradual move towards 
outsourcing all new bus purchases and some materials and services. 
Corporatisation of the public bus market occurred following the 
Transport Act of 1987 when Bus Éireann and Dublin Bus were 
established as distinct companies. Annual PSO subsidies to the bus 
companies are now enveloped in performance contracts; however, like all 
interagency agreements in the Irish public sector, these operate as 
memoranda of understanding and are not employed as enforceable 
contracts at law in the event of breach by either party. Empirical 
studies have shown that, by themselves, unenforced performance 
contracts add little to performance over time, Shirley (1997).  
In the Flemish region of Belgium, the Flemish Government has a 
contractually-binding arrangement with its publicly-owned bus 
transport agency (VVM), De Lign (2003). If the government reduces 
 
16 For examples see UN (2001), World Bank (2002). 
17 www.worldbank.org/transport/urbtrans. 
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its subsidy, VVM may reduce its route network by a corresponding 
amount, while if VVM fails to meet its quality targets, its subsidy will 
be cut. The Flemish Government sets broad transport strategy and 
VVM is responsible for the implementation of policy at both tactical 
and operational levels. At the tactical level VVM is responsible for 
network management, technical co-ordination, tariff schemes, itineraries 
and timetables. At the operational level VVM runs a fleet of 
publicly- and privately-owned buses, all of which share the same “de 
Lign” livery. This approach holds promise for developing the Irish 
bus market and will be examined later. 
Finally, on the World Bank’s scale of choices, at the opposite end 
to public monopoly is privatisation. The two most frequently-chosen 
methods of privatisation are franchising (or competition for the 
market) and de-regulation (or competition in the market). Under bus 
franchising, a public transport authority or public bus regulator 
would seek tenders from private and public bus companies to 
operate various bus routes to agreed quality standards under 
contracts for around five years. Ideally, different contract types 
should yield different policy outcomes under franchising.18  
In 2000, the Department of Public Enterprise proposed the 
franchising of all bus operations in Greater Dublin under an 
independent regulator and the privatisation of Dublin Bus. Some 
commentators felt that de-regulation (or competition in the market) 
would yield greater benefits: under de-regulation, public oversight 
would be limited to questions of safety, standards and competition. 
The Competition Authority (2000) regarded the Department’s 
(franchising) proposals as …a step in the right direction but considered 
that …they may not go far enough. For the provision of bus services 
outside Dublin the Authority recommended deregulation along 
British lines. This is a view with which Barrett (2004) concurs. 
Sufficient time has now elapsed to allow judgements to be drawn 
on the impact of bus deregulation on bus services outside London 
and on the impact of bus franchising on London and Copenhagen – 
the two models proposed for Ireland.  
BUS DEREGULATION AND FRANCHISING ABROAD 
In the UK, long-distance bus operations outside London were 
deregulated in 1980 and other bus operations from 1985. Licensed 
bus operators had to register their timetabled services with regional 
18 Under gross cost contracts the transport authority assumes the revenue risk, with 
the bus operator concerned to minimise costs. Under a net cost franchise for 
tendered routes, the operator is responsible for both costs and revenues. Gross cost 
contracts should prove more efficient for a stable level of passenger demand; but to 
maintain the effectiveness of the network, the transport authority will face 
increasing charges from the incumbent operator in order to induce him to change 
existing routes or to open new routes in response to changing customer 
preferences. The greater commercial uncertainty associated with net cost contracts 
usually means that initial tenders are higher under this system. The difficulty in 
making the bus tender system function as its designers intend is evident in London, 
which started with gross cost tendering, changed to net cost and changed back again 
to gross cost tendering.   9 
Traffic Commissioners, but could set their own fare levels. The UK 
Office of Fair Trading’s remit was subsequently extended to ensure 
competitive practice by bus operators. London adopted a route 
franchising system – or competition for the market – with 
franchisees’ fares/subsidies and operations regulated by Transport 
for London (TfL). 
Four propositions underlaid the 1984 White Paper “Buses”. 
First, deregulation would produce a competitive market, second, 
competition would reduce costs and increase efficiency, third, a 
competitive market would improve the allocation of resources and 
fourth, there would be no undesirable spin-off effects. Ten years 
later Mackie, Preston and Nash (1995) judged bus deregulation 
outside London to have failed and recommended a move to the 
London franchising model. By 2004 the Commission for Integrated 
Transport (CIT) had accepted the failure of bus deregulation and, 
while acknowledging the popularity of the London model with 
politicians,19 ruled it out on cost grounds and instead recommended 
Quality Contracts for bus operations outside London. 
Table 3: Bus Deregulation in Great Britain20
(per cent change 2002/03 on 1984, constant 2002/03 prices) 
Four Propositions  London 
Franchising 
GB Outside London 
Deregulation 
  %  % 




     
2. Efficiency     
Operating costs per passenger journey  -7.3  -1.7 
Drivers’ wages as % national average  n.a.  -30.7 
     
3. Resource Allocation     
Patronage – pass. journeys  +32.7  -35.1 
Real fares  +34.6  +38.1 
Real subsidies per passenger  -31.2  +45.0 
     




Public policy loss 
 
In a bid to make the UK bus market more competitive, the large 
public bus companies were broken up into a large number of private 
companies prior to deregulation. However, the market quickly 
reverted to oligopoly. By 2002 three operators controlled 52 per cent 
of the London market while outside London three operators held a 
53 per cent market share.21 It is almost as though policymakers had 
attempted to impose a perfect competition template onto the bus 
market, ignoring operators’ potential scale and network effects. The 
actual market position is even more uncompetitive, since the 
oligopoly figures conceal de facto local monopolies; the House of 
 
19 A House of Commons Early Day Motion (no. 518 of 6/2/2004) called for local 
authorities to be given the power to franchise bus operations. It attracted cross-
party support. 
20 Department for Transport (2004). 
21 In Scotland, three operators – Firstgroup, Stagecoach and Lothian – accounted 
for 84 per cent of bus revenue in 2001.   10
 
Commons 200222 report found …very little evidence of on-the-road 
competition and what competition did occur took place at the 
boundaries of competitors’ areas.   
Efficiency improved post-deregulation as expected. Real costs 
per passenger journey have fallen by 2-7 per cent, see Table 3. This 
was mainly achieved23 by persistent downward pressure on bus 
drivers’ average earnings – which fell from 100.5 per cent of national 
average earnings in 1986 to 69.7 per cent of national average 
earnings in 2002.24 However, with reduced public subsidies and the 
increasing need to remunerate investment in new buses, none of 
these producer benefits were distributed to customers in the form of 
lower fares. 
The largest failure of bus deregulation has been the continuing 
decline in bus’ modal share of transport. Outside London and with 
the exception of Scotland over the past few years, bus patronage 
since deregulation has declined continuously in Wales, in English 
metropolitan areas and in English shire counties, with most of the 
decline occurring during the first ten years (DfT 2004). In addition 
to the depressing impact of real fare increases on patronage 
(especially in the metropolitan areas), Mackie et al. (1995) considered 
that route/network instability had caused an inward shift in the 
demand curve. 
Finally, some of its spin-off effects – such as a substantial loss of 
service in rural areas and at off-peak times – might have occurred 
even without deregulation. However, almost twenty years after its 
introduction, two behavioural characteristics of a deregulated bus 
system are evident. First, in spite of its malperformance, it is proving 
very difficult to modify. Bus operators opposed the wishes of local 
authorities and MPs to extend the franchising system outside 
London, and the CIT accepted the bus operators’ arguments. 
Second, under deregulation bus transport will make no incremental 
contribution to spatial, social or economic policy, without explicit 
and substantial subsidy. 
With bus deregulation now seen by most commentators as 
having failed,25 not surprisingly bus franchising is perceived as the 
22 Par 28/p. 14.  
23 Deferral of investment in bus renewal also contributed during the early stages. 
24 CIT (2004), p. 16. In 2002 and 2003 CIE’s Annual Reports show that almost 70 
per cent of the total costs of the Irish public bus system were labour costs. 
25 For a pro-deregulation view see Hibbs (2003). Further, both the pro-deregulation 
ideology of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and its conduct came in for severe 
criticism from politicians in the House of Commons Bus Report (2002) e.g. (re on-
the-road competition) Mr. Vickers, DG of OFT, told us that competition always generates 
benefits…He was unable to provide evidence of the benefits of competition in the bus industry. 
And (on network co-ordination) The OFT’s position of investigating and approving any 
form of co-ordination of bus routes is a case of theory running riot over common sense. It is 
disproportionate for the Office to have to make a ruling on whether the number 12 and 13 buses 
can agree to run every 10 minutes, yet be able to ignore mergers between companies that are under 
£70 million in value….The concerns that the OFT has about a loss of consumer benefit that co-
ordinated timetables, fares and frequencies will bring are largely unfounded. We cannot see the 
value of having every such decision investigated and approved by the OFT, nor is it sufficiently 
staffed or expert to do so.  11 
 
next, preferred form of public bus operation in the UK. Elsewhere 
in Europe, franchising was popular because it promised to avoid the 
downside of deregulation and also to provide a more stable service 
level. However, experience of actual bus franchising in London, 
Copenhagen, Helsinki and Stockholm, is that it comes with baggage.  
•  The franchising model by no means assures increases in 
patronage. Copenhagen saw a continuing reduction in 
passenger numbers following the introduction of 
franchising. In London, passenger numbers fell for six years 
following the introduction of franchising. More recently 
they have grown, not due to franchising,26 but because of 
Ken Livingstone’s freeze on bus fares, large service 
investments, increased subsidy and congestion charging. But 
TfL’s current funding gap of £500 million+ is unsustainable 
and UK Treasury pressure will force an increase in fares. 
•  Franchising increases industry consolidation and oligopoly. 
Three operators now control 52 per cent of London’s 
market, 75 per cent of Helsinki’s, 90 per cent of 
Copenhagen’s and 100 per cent of Stockholm’s. Initial 
cost/fare savings are quickly eroded and costs rise through 
uncontested franchise renewal bids. To restore 
competitiveness and to even up information asymmetries, 
TfL (London) and HUR (Copenhagen) are introducing 
cohorts of directly-employed buses. The replacement of a 
public monopoly with a private oligopoly (sometimes also 
including a price cartel) is not the competitive outcome 
which advocates of franchising had anticipated. But it has 
occurred in these four cities. 
•  Public regulation of a bus franchising regime is costly. In 
2000, for an area around Copenhagen with a population of 
2 million, HUR employed 300 people at a payroll cost of 
€24 million.27 In London during 2002/03, TfL employed 
over 700 in bus planning and tendering and over 1,600 in 
corporate administration for a payroll cost of STG£214 (or 
€319 million), Transport for London (2004). If TfL’s 
transport authority functions were scaled per bus to Ireland, 
they would cost €34 million in Dublin and €16 million 
outside Dublin. The Transport Authority model used to 
oversee franchised bus operations abroad would not pass 
the Effectiveness principle set out in the Irish 
Government’s White Paper “Regulating Better” (2004).28 
Experience from abroad strongly suggests that the franchising of 
bus operations under a transport authority will reduce patronage, 
26 House of Commons (2002), The Bus Industry par 100/p. 38. The wide variety of factors 
that contribute to growth in London bus use…means it is not possible to attribute this growth to 
the use of a tendered system of bus procurement…The experience in London shows that if large 
amounts of public subsidy are used to improve bus services, quick and significant improvements can 
be made. 
27 Figures for HUR for later years are unavailable. 
28 In an Irish context, Massey (2004) warned of the danger of sectoral regulatory 
bodies in telecoms, energy etc. exacting monopoly regulatory rents. increase public subsidies and replace a monopoly public operator 
with private oligopolists. More generally, there should now be some 
acknowledgement by competition economists that their attempt to 
make one policy instrument (competition) the sole driver for 
improving bus transport systems, caused these systems to fail: 
competition is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for 
improving bus markets. Designing improved bus transport systems 
is difficult, and it requires not only codified knowledge of how bus 
markets might or should work, but also tacit knowledge of how they 
actually work. As Macmillan noted, events are important. 
 
  One of the best bus systems in the world is in Curitiba, a city with 
a population of 1.6 million in the south of Brazil.29 Although 
Curitiba is relatively wealthy and has a high level of car ownership, 
75 per cent of weekly commuters travel by bus. A state-owned 
company monitors and co-ordinates the system, while 16 private 
companies own and operate the buses and maintain the 
infrastructure. The system is completely financed from bus fares and 
there is no public subsidy. For the past thirty years the city 
administration has pursued a combined spatial and transport 
strategy, with intensive settlement encouraged along dedicated bus 
lanes. In drawing up its master plan, Curitiba had chosen buses30 as 






In moving towards an improved bus system for Ireland, three 
broad elements of best-practise bus systems (such as Curitiba’s) need 
to be emulated viz. 
•  Better integration of spatial and transport strategies. 
•  Cheap and effective co-ordination of the bus market by the 
public authorities and 
•  A strong competitive ethos to reduce bus operating costs in 
providing market-related services. 
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In relation to an integrated development strategy, it is too much 
to hope that Ireland would build dedicated bus ways prior to 
development occurring.31 However, transport policy should have at 
its centre a modal shift from personal car to bus travel.32 Flowing 
from that, how should public oversight and competitive provision of 
bus services be organised? Looking back at Table 2 Network 
Management is operating successfully in Finland and Belgium (Mehta, 
29 Friberg (2001) contains most of what follows. 
30 Curitiba’s largest bi-articulated bus, with dedicated tubes for entry and exit, can 
carry 270 passengers per journey or 4,000 passengers per day. 
31 Perhaps downstream of the macro approach in the National Spatial Strategy, a 
micro approach, as in Flanders, might bear fruit. Here VVM, the public operator, 
may enter voluntary, but legally enforceable agreements, called “conventanten” with 
local councils. Under these the local councils may subsidise local fares, while VVM 
can fund “collateral measures” to eliminate bottlenecks in local traffic, giving 
absolute priority to public transport (free bus lanes, roundabouts, signposting). 92 
per cent of the 309 local councils in Flanders have signed a basic covenant with the 
VVM. 
32 The need for a modal shift to bus travel will be reinforced by Ireland’s 
requirements to meet its Kyoto commitments in a world of dearer, scarcer oil.  13 
 
R. (2004) and Steer et al. (2002)). It is a form of Public-Private 
Partnership under which the private sector provides bus services in 
conjunction with publicly-owned companies.33 The publicly-owned 
operator acts as network manager and lead operator, providing an 
integrated network through a combination of own and 
subcontracted private sector services. This introduces competition 
into the marketplace in a structured manner which is sustainable in 
the longer term. 
Network Management breaches many of the taboos of neo-classical 
competition theory (regulatory capture, information asymmetries, 
the principal-agent problem). But it works. Bus patronage has 
increased in Tampere under network management, following two 
decades of decline prior to that. In both Tampere and Flanders, 
transparent benchmarking between public and private operators has 
increased the efficiency of the public companies: the public subsidy 
in Tampere has fallen to 26 per cent of costs. Ongoing competitive 
tensions contain costs without surrendering control of the network 
to oligopolistic multinational companies. Flanders sets a 5 per cent 
market share limit on individual private operators; in spite of that it 
receives an average of 3 tenders per contract – over twice the 
London experience. Service quality and employee satisfaction are 
high in both Flanders and Tampere. 
Given the characteristics and capabilities of the Irish bus market, 
the network management approach has much to commend it. An 
earlier version – Bus Éireann’s network management of the schools 
transport service – has proved very cost-effective.34 From a user’s 
perspective, patronage should increase if the system delivers on its 
promise of network integration and demand-based routes at low 
cost. The State would retain strategic direction over a necessary 
piece of physical infrastructure rather than cede it to a private 
multinational with a contrary development agenda, as occurred with 
Telecom Éireann: and network management looks like the only 
system which can provide modal shift. For existing State companies, 
network management is less unpalatable than franchising, under 
which they would have been taken over or replaced by 
multinationals. For small private bus operators, it also offers a 
brighter future than under franchising. Network management may 
turn out to be the least unpalatable method of upgrading the Irish 
bus system for its patrons, operators and regulators. 
 
33 In Tampere, Finland, the municipally-owned TCT operates 57 per cent of routes, 
while in Flanders, Belgium, the publicly-owned VVM (branded as “De Lijn”) 
operates 58 per cent of routes. Flanders is targeting a 50 per cent share of bus 
provision by SME’s. 
34 Steer et al. (2002) School transport organised by Bus Éireann costs an average of €512 per 
pupil carried. This compares favourably with an average cost of transport per pupil in Northern 
Ireland of €615, in Scotland €832, and €875 in the English shires. It is also at the bottom end 
of the American range of €500 to over €1,100 per pupil. Previous reviews of school transport 
provision – notably by Deloitte and Touche in the early 1990s – concluded that the current 
management arrangements offered good value for money.  
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